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FIRMS’ NON-RELIANCE JUDGMENT, RESTATEMENT VENUE CHOICE, AND 
LITIGATION RISK 
 
This paper examines the determinants of firms’ non-reliance judgment and the 
effect of restatements disclosure venue choice on future litigation risk. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires firms to disclose any error that will undermine 
investors’ reliance on previously issued financial statements in Item 4.02 of Form 8-K 
starting on August 23, 2004. The requirements for non-reliance judgments lack clear 
guidelines; raising concerns that firms are cloaking errors and mistakes through opaque 
disclosure venues instead of the more prominent Form 8-K.  
 
This paper is the first to investigate the quantitative and qualitative criteria that 
firms use for non-reliance judgments and estimate the likelihood of specific disclosure 
venue choice. Applying this estimation into securities class-action litigation setting with 
controls for restatement characteristics and potential self-selection biases, I find that a more 
prominent restatement disclosure venue is associated with higher future litigation risk.   
 
This finding provides a plausible explanation for the current popularity of so-called 
‘stealth restatements.’ These findings are robust to the exclusion of a transition period of 
the new regulation, firms with multiple restatements, and dismissed lawsuits. 
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Chapter 1:  INTRODUCTION 
In response to the “real time issuer disclosure” mandate of Section 409 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the SEC issued the Final rule about additional Form 8-K 
disclosure requirements and acceleration of filing date (the Final rule) in August 2004. The 
Final rule requires a firm to disclose any error in Item 4.02 of Form 8-K within four 
business days of a triggering event, defined as the  date when the firm or its auditor 
concludes that the previously issued financial statements “no longer should be relied upon 
because of errors in such financial statements” (SEC 2004a). That is, if a restatement 
renders the firm’s previously issued financial statements unreliable, the firm must disclose 
the restatement under Item 4.02 of Form 8-K (hereafter, 4.02-8K restatements). 4.02-8K 
restatement disclosure is a new requirement introduced by the SEC with the intent of 
enhancing market efficiency by improving the prominence and timeliness of disclosures of 
“unquestionably or presumptively material events that must be disclosed currently” (SEC 
2004a).   
However, the absence of bright-line guidance to the non-reliance judgment results 
in diverse interpretations and applications of this disclosure regulation, raising the concern 
that firms are applying the disclosure regulation opportunistically to keep their errors and 
mistakes “under the regulatory radar” (Myers et al. 2013).1 Scholz (2014) reports that firms 
are increasingly restating earnings directly in periodic filings (10-K or 10-Q) or amended 
filings (10-K/A or 10-Q/A) without filing Form 8-K first. I term these kinds of restatements 
as non 4.02-8K restatements.2 Specifically, Scholz (2014) finds that the percentage of non 
                                                 
1 Myers et al. (2013) argue that “some firms continue to disclosure severe restatements in the most obscure 
disclosure venue,” i.e., in regular periodic filings to the SEC (10-K or 10-Q).  
2  Such restatements are also known as “stealth restatements,” “revision restatements,” or “non 4.02 
restatements.”   
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4.02-8K restatements, i.e., restatements made directly in periodic filings or amended filings 
without filing Form 8-K first, increases monotonically from 39% in 2005 to 65% in 2012 
(see also AuditAnalytics 2014) since the adoption of the Final rule in 2004. This seems to 
imply that firms choose restatement disclosure venues opportunistically.  
However, before making any inference about the firms’ behaviors or incentives, we 
must understand the firms’ non-reliance judgment, as firms are not required to use 4.02-
8K restatement if they conclude that errors in the previously issued financial statements do 
not undermine investors’ reliance on these financial statements (PWC 2014; EY 2015).  
Thus, the frequency analysis of non 4.02-8K restatements without the consideration of 
firms’ non-reliance judgments criteria might induce erroneous conclusion about the 
relation between firms’ choice of restatement disclosure venue and the disclosure quality. 
This paper contributes to the materiality and restatement literatures in several ways. 
First, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence regarding the non-reliance 
judgment criteria that firms are using to choose a restatement disclosure venue. I adopt 
quantitative, qualitative, and contextual consideration variables from the SEC guideline 
and prior materiality literature, and provide empirical evidence about the determinants of 
the non-reliance judgment. 
Second, this paper clarifies key concepts sometimes misused in the restatements 
literature. As Scholz (2014) points out, 4.02-8K restatements after the Final rule are not 
directly comparable with 8-K restatements announced before August 2004, although both 
are announced in Form 8-K. That is because 8-K restatements filed before the Final rule 
are based on firms’ voluntary disclosure incentives, while 4.02-8K restatements after the 
Final rule are mandatory when a non-reliance judgment is made (Lerman and Livnat 2010). 
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However, prior restatements research does not differentiate between these two different 
disclosure regimes, and commonly includes data from both periods in one sample. I only 
use 4.02-8K restatements filed after Aug. 2004 to remove any internal validity concerns 
(Heitzman, Wasley, and Zimmerman 2010). Further, I also provide an explanation and 
evidence regarding how non-reliance judgments are similar but not equal to materiality 
judgments. 
Third, this paper extends the scope of the materiality judgment literature. Many 
empirical studies have evaluated the nature of materiality and tested materiality thresholds 
(Messier et al. 2005). However, these studies mainly focus on specific accounts (e.g., 
Gleason and Mills 2002; Liu and Mittelstaedt 2002; Acito et al. 2009) or accounting rule 
changes (e.g., Keune and Johnstone 2012).3 Notwithstanding the significant contribution 
of these studies, there exists little evidence that the findings in these studies apply to other 
accounts or settings. Given the small samples employed in earlier studies, external validity 
concerns are possibly nontrivial. 4  The accounting restatements database of the Audit 
Analytics encompasses diverse accounting issues such as errors, irregularities, and 
misapplications of GAAP; this comprehensive dataset allows me to test whether the prior 
findings in materiality studies can be applied to other settings. I adopt the materiality 
thresholds benchmarks and other contextual considerations and show that the quantitative 
and qualitative considerations within the materiality literature hold in more generalized 
settings.  
                                                 
3 Gleason and Mills (2002), Liu and Mittelstaedt (2002), Acito et al. (2009), and Keune and Johnstone (2012) 
investigate materiality issue related to contingent tax liability, retiree health care costs under SFAS No. 81, 
operating lease, and SAB 108, respectively. 
4 One exception is Acito et al. (2015), which examines the SEC comment letters about firms’ materiality 
judgment and proposes a simplified model for managers’ materiality judgment. 
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Finally, I provide evidence that disclosure prominence increases firms’ future 
securities class-action litigation risk after controlling for the self-selection bias of firms to 
choose less prominent disclosure venue to lower the likelihood of litigation risk without 
regard to non-reliance judgment. Files et al. (2009) observe positive relations between 
conspicuous press releases about earnings restatements and future litigation risk. Drawing 
on restatements database and non-reliance determinants estimation, I generalize their 
findings in two ways. First, I broaden the scope of disclosure venue from the press release 
to the main restatement disclosure venues such as 4.02-8K, periodic SEC filings (e.g., 10-
K and 10-Q), and amended SEC filings (e.g., 10-K/A, 10-Q/A). Second, I apply the 
determinants of non-reliance judgments to estimate firms’ likelihood to choose 4.02-8K 
restatements at given conditions. This equation provides a theoretical basis for the first part 
of the Heckman two-stage model, which is widely adopted to control for the self-selection 
bias in econometric models. Self-selection bias could arise when firms make disclosure 
choice strategically in anticipation of future litigation risk.  This potential bias could result 
in biased estimation in determining the disclosure choice effect on litigation risk. 
The next section discusses the related literature and develops my research question 
and hypothesis. Section III explains the data and research design, and the following section 
presents the analysis results. The last section provides summary and concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Error Correction and its Disclosure 
Any accounting error in prior financial statements resulting from the mathematical 
mistakes, GAAP misapplication, or ignorance of facts should be corrected and reported by 
restating the prior statements (FASB ASC 250-45-23). However, the restatement process 
is diverse depending on the different level of materiality of errors.  
If the error is deemed immaterial by management, the error needs not be corrected 
at all (FASB ASC 105-10-05-6; Acito et al. 2015), and if the error is material, then the 
error correction should be disclosed in amended (e.g., 10-K/A) or periodic (e.g., 10-K) 
SEC filings (PWC 2014; EY 2015).5 For instance, Acito et al. (2009) test the determinants 
of materiality judgment using 250 operating lease accounting errors corrected by U.S. firms 
during 2004 to 2006. They categorize the error correction methods into formal restatements 
and catch-up adjustments according to the materiality of errors. 6    
Before the Final rule, financial statements users can only identify a firm’s material 
accounting error after the firm discloses it in amended or periodic filings, with the 
exception of when a firm uses the voluntary Form 8-K disclosure or press release about the 
error identified.7 However, after the SEC Final rule about the new form 8-K disclosure, 
firms must decide whether the past financial statements which contain material errors 
                                                 
5 The restatement through periodic filings is allowed by SEC for the error that is immaterial to each of prior 
periods but becomes material when the cumulative error is corrected in current period (SAB 108; Scholz 
2014). This type of restatement is known as “little r restatements” (EY 2015). 
6  “Catch-up” adjustment is also known as “out-of-period” adjustment, which is a way to correct prior 
immaterial errors by changing current financial statement number. See Acito et al. (2015) for a specific 
example of catch-up adjustment. 
7 Before the Final rule, Form 8-K was required only for six specific events such as a change in control of the 
company and the company’s bankruptcy, and three broad events. The voluntary 8-K disclosure of accounting 
errors is based on this broadly defined event which companies deem to be of importance to their shareholder 
(SEC 2002; Lerman and Livnat 2010). 
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should be relied upon, and disclosure them using the Item 4.02 in Form 8-K within four 
business days after this decision (SEC 2004a).  
This Item 4.02 in Form 8-K requirements is mandatory and needs to be filed 
separately even when the triggering event happens within four business days before other 
SEC filing (SEC 2004b).8 Because of this significant change in disclosure regulation, 
Scholz (2014) categorizes restatements into 4.02 restatements for the restatements 
disclosed with preceding Item 4.02 Form 8-K filing and non 4.02 restatements for 
restatements without it after the Final rule.9  
This review of SEC regulations and literature indicates that a material error 
requiring the additional disclosure of a non-reliance judgment is different from a material 
error that does not. 
 
2.2 Materiality and Non-reliance Judgment 
SEC SAB No. 99 (1999) defines a matter as material “if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important” and emphasizes the 
simultaneous use of quantitative and qualitative considerations for the materiality 
judgment. 10  However, no clear threshold exists for the determination of a distinction 
between immaterial and material issues. In practice, however, five percent of income 
threshold is widely acknowledged as a ‘rule of thumb’ benchmark for the materiality 
threshold (Nelson et al. 2005; Acito et al. 2009)  
                                                 
8 “All Item 4.01 and Item 4.02 events must be reported on Form 8-K” (SEC 2004b). 
9  The Audit Analytics uses the term of reissuance restatements for 4.02-8K restatements and revision 
restatements for non 4.02-8K restatements (Audit Analytics 2015). Following Scholz (2014), I use the term 
of non 4.02-8K restatements for all restatements disclosed without the preceding Item 4.02 in Form 8-K. 
10 U.S. supreme court regards an item as “material if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of 
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total 
mix of information made available” (Heitzman et al. 2010).  
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Acito et al. (2009) provide anecdotal evidence about difference between material 
and immaterial error using the 5% of earnings benchmark. They show that most catch-up 
adjustments take place at the magnitude less than 5% of annualized quarterly net income, 
while the frequency distribution of restatements is widely spread around 5% benchmark, 
suggesting that qualitative considerations plays an important role for materiality judgment 
as well.  
If non 4.02-8K restatements are employed only when identified errors are 
immaterial, then I should find a similar distribution to catch-up adjustments when I apply 
the same criteria in my sample. Results in Figure 1 show that the frequency distributions 
of non 4.02-8K restatements are similar to that of 4.02-8K restatements, providing an 
anecdotal evidence that non 4.02-8K restatements are also related to materiality. This 
suggests that additional criteria are necessary to disentangle errors requiring non-reliance 
judgment from other material errors. 
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FIGURE 1 
Frequency Distribution of Relative Misstated Amount 
Panel A: Non 4.02-8K restatements 
 
Panel B: 4.02-8K restatements 
 
Panel C: 4.02-8K restatements with SEVERITY ≥ 3 
 
This figure shows the frequency of relative misstated amount over net income (|RS_ANI|). X-axis is the 
relative misstated amount and Y-axis is the frequency of each bin. Panel C has the same Y scale as A and B 
to facilitate comparison, except for maximum value. 
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The SEC amends Form 8-K disclosure requirements in 2004 “to provide investors 
with better and faster disclosure of important corporate events” by expanding the number 
of Form 8-K items and by shortening the filing deadline for most items to four business 
days after a triggering event. Specifically, the SEC clarifies the purpose of 2004 
amendment as follows; 
“The limited number of Form 8-K disclosure items permitted a public company to 
delay disclosure of many significant events until the due date for its next periodic 
report. During such a delay, the market was unable to assimilate such undisclosed 
information into the value of a company's securities. The revisions that we adopt 
today will benefit markets by increasing the number of unquestionably or 
presumptively material events that must be disclosed currently” (emphasize added) 
(SEC 2004a). 
The SEC clears up the unique characteristics of material events that should be 
reported in Form 8-K in its 2006 revision of Form 8-K. In response to the significant 
increase of executive compensation disclosure under Item 1.01, the SEC decides to limit 
the scope of executive compensation disclosure and only include compensation disclosure 
that is unquestionably and presumptively material to investors.11  
My review of the purpose of the Final rule leads to the conclusion that SEC treats 
material errors and unquestionably material errors differently and the anecdotal evidence 
in Figure 1 implies that non-reliance judgement is the materiality judgement required for 
the unquestionably material events, and has positive relation with the severity of errors.12   
                                                 
11 “…, we believe that much of the disclosure regarding employment compensation matters required in real-
time under the Form 8-K requirements is viewed by investors as material. However, we also believe it is 
appropriate to restore a more balanced approach to this aspect of Form 8-K, an approach which is designed 
to elicit unquestionably or presumptively material information on a real-time basis, but seeks to limit Form 
8-K required disclosure of information below that threshold” (SEC 2006b). 
12 Scholz (2014) also posits that “4.02-8K restatements are generally more serious than other restatements.” 
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Myers et al. (2013) and Plumlee and Yohn (2014) are similar to this paper in that 
they examine the determinants of restatements disclosure venue choices using the same 
dependent variable and comparable independent variables such as restatements 
characteristics.  However, the purpose and results of my study are quite different from 
theirs in several aspects.  First, their research focus is on contextual and external factors 
that might have effect on firms’ Form 8-K disclose choice without regard to their non-
reliance judgment.  In contrast, my main focus is on identifying determinants of firms’ non-
reliance judgment for 4.02-8K restatements. Second, they do not differentiate voluntary 
disclosure regime from mandatory disclosure regime and use restatements filed in Form 8-
K before and after the Final rule for their main analysis.13 Although they account for this 
difference by adopting an indicator variable for restatement announced after the Final rule 
and performing subsample analysis, the tests about voluntary disclosure choice might lead 
to incorrect inference under the different disclosure regimes (Heitzman et al. 2010). I use 
restatements data after the SEC Final rule so that I can rule out any potential internal 
validity issue. Third, both papers test the effect of prominent disclosure on the stock market 
response.  In contrast, my research investigates the effect of prominent disclosure on the 
future litigation risk. 
 
2.3 Non-Reliance Judgment Considerations 
As just reviewed before, the non-reliance judgment about the errors in prior 
financial statements is closely related to the materiality judgement. Therefore, I use prior 
                                                 
13 Myers et al. (2013) use restatements announced from Jan. 1. 2002 to Mar. 31. 2008. Plumbee and Yohn 
(2014) use restatements disclosed between 2003 and 2006. The 8K disclosures in these studies before Aug. 
2004 are voluntary and unrelated to non-reliance judgment. 
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literature about materiality (e.g., Acito et al. 2009) as a source of theory and empirical 
criteria in my investigation of non-reliance judgments. In addition, as suggested by a SEC 
staff member, I adopt SEC SAB 99 as a guide for this study of non-reliance judgments.14 
I divide non-reliance judgment considerations into five categories: quantitative 
considerations, qualitative considerations part 1 - net income trends, qualitative 
considerations part 2 - restatements characteristics, contextual considerations related to the 
choice of restatement disclosure venue other than quantitative and qualitative 
considerations, and other control variables pertinent to firms’ general disclosure choice. 
This comprehensive set of categories is expected to capture the relevant criteria that firms 
use to make non-reliance judgment. 
Quantitative factors are one of the most intuitive and widely-adopted materiality 
considerations. The simple rationale of this quantitative consideration is that the relative 
size of an error determines whether the error is material or not (Acito et al. 2009). Prior 
archival studies find that firms often use income magnitude benchmarks, but in some cases, 
firms may employ balance sheet information as well (Messier et al. 2005). 15 To examine 
all alternative methods, I adopt seven different benchmarks taken from the income 
statement and balance sheet, and evaluate the individual and composite effect of 
quantitative factors that firms are considering when they make non-reliance judgments. 
Following SAB 99, I also use income trend in the restatement announcement year 
as a qualitative consideration. In many cases, the income adjustment effect of restatements 
                                                 
14 “An item 4.02 8-K is not automatically required for every error in the financial statements. It would depend 
on a SAB 99 quantitative and qualitative analysis” (Dorsey 2006) 
15 Prior restatements studies use just one benchmark to scale the magnitude of an error. For example, Hennes 
et al (2014) use total assets to scale the magnitude of errors, and Myers et al. (2013) scale the misstated 
amount by net income at the beginning of year in which restatement is announced. 
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does not have a direct effect on the restatements announcement period income. However, 
the restatement announcement is closely related to current period stock performance, 
implying that firms that usually care for current period stock performance may consider 
the income trend of the current period rather than prior periods when making a disclosure 
venue choice. Similarly, prior literature (e.g., Acito et al. 2009) also uses the current period 
income as a materiality decision benchmark. The income adjustment effect of restatements 
on meeting or beating market consensus is not included as one of the qualitative 
considerations because the current period analysts’ forecasts are not affected by the prior 
years’ income number change.  
Hennes et al. (2008) emphasize that it is important to distinguish accounting 
irregularities from technical errors in restatements research. I also conjecture that 
individual and combined characteristics of restatements have differential effect on firms’ 
non-reliance judgments, and that the more severe restatements are more likely to be 
associated with non-reliance judgments. Following Hennes et al (2014), I adopt five 
individual restatement characteristics and a composite restatement severity index as 
secondary qualitative considerations to reflect the numerous aspects of a restatement. 
In addition to the quantitative and qualitative factors mentioned in SAB 99, other 
contextual factors can have an effect on firms’ restatement venue choice. For example, 
Myers et al. (2013) argue that the number of analysts following the firm, the proportion of 
institutional investors holding the firms’ equity, and industry-specific accounting practices 
toward 8-K disclosure choices are significantly related to firms’ disclosure choice. 
Additionally, Files et al. (2009) posit that the number of management forecasts is 
associated with firms’ disclosure prominence choices. Finally, Acito et al. (2009) observe 
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that firms’ having high earnings quality and litigation risk might use lower thresholds in 
materiality decisions. Based on the prior literature, I conjecture that external monitoring 
influences, external financing motivations, accounting quality of individual firms, industry 
norms for 4.02-8K restatements, and litigation risk within same industry might affect the 
likelihood of 4.02-8K restatements disclosure venue choice. Based upon my literature 
reviews, I prepare my research question (RQ1) about firms’ non-reliance judgment criteria 
as follows; 
RQ1: What quantitative, qualitative, and contextual criteria do firms consider when 
making non-reliance judgment about the errors in their past financial 
statements?  
 
2.4 Disclosure Prominence and Litigation Risk 
Firms’ voluntary disclosures and their effect on litigation draw intense attention 
due to the detrimental consequences of litigation on firms’ operational activities and 
reputation (Field et al. 2005).  
Prior disclosure research focuses on understanding whether prompt disclosure of 
bad news increases or decreases the likelihood of litigation (Skinner 1997). To answer this 
question, Field et al. (2005) employ a simultaneous equation model, and provide empirical 
evidence that a preemptive disclosure of bad earnings news lowers future litigation risk 
after controlling for the endogeneity of disclosure choice and dismissed suits. Additionally, 
Donelson et al. (2012) confirms this negative relation between voluntary disclosure and 
litigation risk using analysts’ earnings forecast consensus as a proxy for the timely 
revelation of future bad earnings news. 
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However, these studies have some limitations. First, the prior studies focus only on 
the effect of negative earnings surprise on future litigation risk. For this reason, Field et al. 
(2005) and Donelson et al. (2012) delete lawsuits related to the accounting irregularities 
such as GAAP violations from their samples. Second, these studies leave out any potential 
effect of firms’ differential disclosure venue choice on litigation risk. For example, Field 
et al. (2005) posit that they do not expect any relation between disclosure choice and 
litigation risk when lawsuits are related to accounting irregularities. Third, prior disclosure 
studies use the management earnings forecast and analyst earnings forecast(s) as a proxy 
for firms disclosure choice. These research design choices collectively reduce the sample 
size significantly; compared with the number of lawsuits reported in the Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse database, Field et al. (2005) and Donelson et al. (2012) only account 
for 8.2% and 17.9% of total lawsuits filed during the respective sample period.16 
Another stream of accounting literature about litigation risk is related to the effect 
of disclosure prominence. Files et al. (2009) find evidence that a prominent press release 
that mentions the restatement in its headline has a higher chance of future class-action 
lawsuits than the less prominent press release that remarks the restatement in body or in 
footnote. They support their empirical findings with “limited attention theory,” which 
predicts a less severe market response and thus lower chance of plaintiffs’ attention for a 
less prominent press release relative to a prominent one. They also provide anecdotal 
evidence that news clipping functions inside class action law firms makes it hard for firms’ 
restatement news reported in headlines go unnoticed. 
                                                 
16 The number of firms sued in my sample is 772, which is 47.7% of the total lawsuits in the Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse database reported from Aug. 23. 2004 to Dec. 31. 2013. 
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I extend the argument advanced by Files et al (2009) and generalize their findings 
using a comprehensive restatements sample and diverse disclosure venues. Specifically, I 
conjecture that the prominent disclosure venue such as 4.02-8K restatement, all others 
being equal, will have higher likelihood of future litigation risk compared to less notable 
disclosure venues such as periodic or amended restatements (non 4.02-8K restatements). 
Therefore, my hypothesis (H1) about the association between prominence of disclosure 
and litigation risk is as follows in alternative form:  
H1: The prominence of restatement disclosure is positively associated with the 
likelihood of future securities class action lawsuits risk. 
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Chapter 3: DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample 
I obtain an initial sample of 10,406 accounting restatements from the Audit 
Analytics database announced between Aug. 2004 and Dec. 2013.17 1,553 restatements 
observations (14.9%) are excluded because these restatements are first disclosed in forms 
other than Press release, 8-K, 8-K/A, 10-K, 10-K/A, 10-Q, or 10-Q/A.18 Restatements filed 
by firms not covered by Compustat and CRSP are also eliminated. 
The disclosure venue data in the Audit Analytics is related to the initial detection 
of errors, not the final restatement filings. For example, it is possible that a firm voluntarily 
discloses the discovery of errors using Item 8.01 (Other events) in Form 8-K, but later the 
firm corrects the error in its periodic filing. In this case, the Audit Analytics record 8-K for 
this restatement disclosure venue (i.e., form_fkey=8-K in the Audit Analytics). Therefore, 
to answer my research question of this paper, restatements first disclosed by Press release 
and 8-K need to be verified whether the firms file Item 4.02 in Form 8-K after their initial 
disclosure of error. This manual examination eliminates other 208 restatements. 
Accounting data availability requirement deletes additional 477 restatements. Panel A in 
Table 1 outlines my sample selection process. 
Table 1, Panel B presents industry distribution of restatements disclosure firms, 
with high concentrations in the Manufacturing (36.7%), Services (17.8%), and Finance, 
Insurance, & Real Estate (17.2%). Panel C finds the decreasing number of restatement 
                                                 
17 The Audit Analytics database defines restatements as “a revision of previously filed financial statements 
as a result of an error, fraud or GAAP misapplication.” Based on this definition, the Audit Analytics excludes 
restatements related to accounting principles changes, estimation changes, and subsequent filings of the same 
accounting issue. 
18 Examples of other forms include 20-F, 6-K, S-1, and NT 10-K or NT 10-Q. Form 20-F and 6-K are filed 
by foreign companies. Form S-1 is the initial registration form. And NT 10-K(Q) is required when firms are 
not able to file 10-K(Q) in time. 
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disclosures and the decreasing proportion of 4.02-8K restatements. The proportion of 4.02-
8K restatements shrinks from 75.8% in 2005 to 24.2% in 2013, consistent with concerns 
that more firms are evading from the Form 8-K disclosure requirements.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample 
Panel A: Sampling Procedure 
     Observations  
Restatements reported in Audit Analytics during Aug. 2004-Dec. 2013 10,406  
After removing    
     Restatements in other forms than 8-K, 10-K(/A), 10-Q(/A) 8,853  
     Firms not covered by COMPUSTAT 6,199  
     Firms not covered by CRSP 4,116  
     8-K restatements not using Item 4.02 and missing required data a 3,431  
 
Panel B: Sample Frequency by Industry 
Industry Title SIC code     Frequency % Cumulative % 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 01-09 6  0.2% 0.2% 
Mining 10-14 239  7.0% 7.1% 
Construction 15-17 38  1.1% 8.3% 
Manufacturing 20-39 1,258  36.7% 44.9% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric etc. 40-49 307  9.0% 53.9% 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 103  3.0% 56.9% 
Retail Trade 52-59 279  8.1% 65.0% 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 60-67 589  17.2% 82.2% 
Services 70-89 610  17.8% 100.0% 
Total      3,429  b 100.0%  
 
Panel C: Sample Frequency by Year and by Restatement Disclosure Venue 
Year Periodic Amended 4.02-8K Total 4.02-8K/Total 10K 10Q 10K/A 10Q/A 
  2004 c 10 10 6 11 101 138 73.2% 
2005 55 58 14 23 470 620 75.8% 
2006 65 51 28 61 370 575 64.3% 
2007 47 35 39 45 256 422 60.7% 
2008 46 31 33 29 158 297 53.2% 
2009 32 16 35 17 117 217 53.9% 
2010 62 9 56 17 99 243 40.7% 
2011 68 10 98 8 86 270 31.9% 
2012 111 7 120 8 73 319 22.9% 
2013 104 8 132 6 80 330 24.2% 
Total 600 235 561 225 1,810 3,431 52.8% 
 
a The sample size is varying depending on the different analysis and regressions. b Two restatements have no 
SIC information. c 2004 data includes restatements announced after the SEC Final rule (Aug. 23rd 2004). 
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3.2 Non-Reliance Judgment Criteria 
Following Acito et al. (2009, 2015) and SAB 99 guideline, I construct qualitative, 
quantitative, and contextual considerations categories that firms are likely to use to make 
non-reliance judgments. First, I proxy for quantitative considerations using seven financial 
benchmarks as denominators of the absolute value of the misstated amount (|RS_|). 
Specifically, annual net income (|RS_ANI|), annualized three-year net income 
(|RS_AQNI|), normalized quarterly net income (|RS_NQNI|), annualized 12-quarter net 
income (|RS_N3QNI|), annual sales (|RS_ASALES|), equity (|RS_EQUITY|), and total 
assets (|RS_ASSETS|) are used to account for the quantitative factors in non-reliance 
judgment. I expect each of the seven benchmarks to have positive effect on the non-reliance 
judgment. Appendix A provides detailed explanation about operationalization of each 
measure. 
Second, qualitative considerations part 1 (QUALITATIVE1) is mainly measured 
by the association of the misstated amount with current net income trend. Specifically, I 
adopt benchmarks measuring whether the restatements are associated with annual or 
quarterly net income trend change (TREND_A, TREND_Q), annual or quarterly loss at 
the end of period (LOSS_A, LOSS_Q), and positive effect on net income in the misstated 
period (INCREASE). Because the effect of restatements on these variables is indirect, I 
have no prior prediction about the coefficient estimates. 
Third, qualitative considerations part 2 (QUALITATIVE2) is related to 
restatements characteristics. Following prior research (Myers et al. 2013; Hennes et al. 
2014), I use six variables to measure the characteristics and severity of restatements: 
restatements related to fraud (FRAUD) and SEC investigation (SEC), the number of issues 
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involved in the restatements (NUMBER), restatements related to the one of the core 
accounts such as revenue, expense, and cost of goods sold (CORE), the misstated period 
(PERIOD), and a composite index variable which has a value from zero to five depending 
on the severity of restatements (SEVERITY). Although the five individual variables and 
composite index variable are highly correlated, variance inflation factors (VIFs) in the OLS 
regression are well below the 10-cutoff level. I therefore include all six control variables 
in my analysis.19 I expect a positive effect between all six variables on the non-reliance 
judgment. 
Fourth, contextual considerations variables are included to account for the 
individual firms’ incentives to use different disclosure venues due to unique situational 
factors. These factors include whether firms use Big 4 auditing firms (AUDITOR), whether 
accounting quality is high (QUALITY), whether the industry accounting practices about 
8-K disclosure choice is different (PRACTICES), whether an auditor is changed after the 
misstated period (AUDITOR_CHG), whether firms belong to high litigation risk industry 
(LITIGATION_RISK), whether firms issue debts or stocks before or after the restatements 
(DEBT_ISSUE, STOCK_ISSUE), whether firms are under debt or stock market 
monitoring system (DEBT_MONITER, STOCK_MONITER).  
Finally, following disclosure and materiality literature (e.g., Field et al. 2005; Acito 
et al. 2009; Keune and Johnstone 2012), I include additional control variables that might 
affect firms’ non-reliance judgments and disclosure behaviors; financial distress (LOSS), 
growth opportunity (GROWTH), and information asymmetry (SIZE). I provide no specific 
prediction for control variables. In addition, I also control for the effect of firms that restates 
                                                 
19 The VIF value for SEVERITY and CORE are 3.59 and 2.11, respectively. 
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their financial statements repetitively (REPEAT). To control for the repetitive firm 
appearance in my sample, I also cluster standard errors at the firm level for each regression. 
Moreover, I perform sensitivity test after excluding the second and subsequent restatements 
filed by the same firms.  
 
3.3 Litigation Risk 
The likelihood of securities class-action litigation depends foremost on the 
magnitude of stock market response and stock turnover rate (Field et al. 2005). The 
intuition behind this is that more negative stock market responses is likely to make the 
convincing case for stockholders’ damage. In addition, the more volatile stock turnover 
makes the total recoverable damages larger, generating strong incentives for law firms to 
file a lawsuit. 
Following Files et al. (2009), I adopt the current period return (3DAY_RETURN), 
prior period return (PRIOR_RETURN), post period stock response (PSOT_RETURN), 
and the historical share turnover rate (SHARE_TURN) to capture comprehensive future 
litigation risk in response to the restatement announcements. In addition, I add the net 
income amount affected by restatements for all periods and scale it by annualized 12-
quarter net income (|RS_N3QNI|) to capture the severance of a restatement. Financial 
industry dummies (FINANCIAL) are included along with other control variables because 
financial firms are expected to suffer less negative stock response to bad news (Files et al. 
2009). 
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3.4 Model Specification for Research Question 
I examine my research question by estimating logit regression in which the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if firms make non-reliance 
judgment and file the identified event(s) in Item 4.02 Form 8-K, and zero if firms disclose 
restatement in other SEC filing forms. I first separately test quantitative consideration 
variables and choose the most representative and optimal benchmark. To control for the 
decreasing relative frequency of 4.02-8K restatements, the decreasing trend of the 
frequency of overall restatements, and time-varying confounding effect such as changing 
accounting practices and interpretation about the Final rule, year dummy variables are 
included in all regressions. The simplified representation of model for my research question 
is as follows;  
P(4.02-8K) = f (β0 + β1QUANTITATIVE + β2QUALITATIVE1 + 
β3QUALITATIVE2 + β4CONTEXTUAL + β5OTHER CONTROL + 
Year Fixed Effects + ε)                                                                       (1) 
 
3.5 Model Specification for Hypothesis 
To test my hypothesis of whether 4.02-8K restatements increases the likelihood of 
future litigation risk, I adopt the Heckman two-stage selection model and control for the 
possibility that firms that are eager to lower future litigation risk might self-select less 
prominent disclosure venues. 
The first stage involves estimating probability of choosing 4.02- 8K disclosure 
venue using the equation and variables I identified in previous section. Next, the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (INVERSEMILLS) is calculated based on the logit regression results. By 
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incorporating this ratio in the second stage equation, I can control for the possibility of 
firms choosing less prominent disclosure venue choice without regard to the non-reliance 
judgment to lower the litigation risk. If the coefficients of the Inverse Mills Ratio are 
significant in the second regression, it is likely there exits self-selection bias in the equation. 
I drop Qualitative1 consideration in equation (1) to abide by the Heckman exclusion 
condition that requires one or more variables in the first-stage regression should be 
excluded in the second-stage regression. 
P(LITIGATION) = f (β0 + β14.02-8K + β2RS_AMOUNT + β3Qualitative2 + 
β4Contextual + β5Control variables + β63DAY_RETURN + 
β7PRIOR_RETURN + β8POST_RETURN + β9SHARE_TURN + 
β10FINANCIAL + β11INVERSEMILLS + Year Fixed Effects + ε)      (2) 
To test Myers et al. (2013)’s argument that different prominence of restatement 
disclosure induces differential economic consequences, I construct a new variable, 
PROMINENCE, which has value of 1 if restatement is disclosed in periodic SEC filings, 
2 if disclosed in amended filings, and 3 if disclosed in 4.02-8K filings. In this test, the 
Heckman’s first stage equation is based on the multinomial logit regression of 
PROMINENCE on quantitative, qualitative, and other variables I identified in the equation 
(1). In addition, the second stage equation is similar to equation (2) except for the fact that 
PROMINENCE replaces 4.02-8K. The simplified representation of first stage multinomial 
logit regression is as follows;  
P(PROMINENCE) = f (β0 + β1QUANTITATIVE + β2QUALITATIVE1 + 
β3QUALITATIVE2 + β4CONTEXTUAL + 
β5OTHERCONTROL + Year Fixed Effects + ε)             (3) 
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Chapter 4. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about the regression variables after 
winsorizing all continuous dependent variables at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distributions. Panel B of Table 2 reports Pearson correlations. As expected, the correlation 
between the same consideration variables is significantly high, and 4.02-8K have a 
significant correlation with most variables in quantitative, qualitative, and contextual 
consideration. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Simple Statistics 
Variable N Mean STDDEV Q1 Median Q3 
4.02-8K 3,431 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
|RS_ANI| 3,137 0.43 1.38 0.00 0.04 0.22 
|RS_A3NI| 3,137 0.29 1.06 0.00 0.04 0.18 
|RS_NQNI| 3,135 0.16 0.43 0.00 0.02 0.11 
|RS_N3QNI| 3,137 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.19 
|RS_ASALES| 3,072 0.12 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.02 
|RS_EQUITY| 3,137 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.03 
|RS_TA| 3,137 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 
TREND_A 3,431 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LOSS_A 3,431 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TREND_Q 3,431 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LOSS_Q 3,431 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
INCREASE 3,431 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FRAUD 3,431 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SEC 3,431 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NUMBER 3,431 2.23 1.58 1.00 2.00 3.00 
CORE 3,431 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PERIOD 3,431 6.17 0.95 5.61 6.12 6.91 
SEVERITY 3,431 0.79 0.89 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AUDITOR 3,431 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
QUALITY 3,431 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 
PRACTICES 3,429 0.48 0.07 0.43 0.48 0.52 
AUDITOR_CHG 3,431 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LITIGATION_RISK 3,431 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DEBT_ISSUE 3,411 0.17 0.92 0.00 0.04 0.15 
STOCK_ISSUE 3,411 0.10 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.04 
DEBT_MONITER 3,431 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 
STOCK_MONITER 3,431 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
INCENTIVE_RATIO 1,155 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.31 
LOG_HOLDINGS 1,155 8.93 2.44 7.87 9.24 10.36 
CEO_CHG 1,155 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OVERCON_1 1,155 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
OVERCON_2 1,155 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LOSS 3,431 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GROWTH 3,431 2.16 2.79 1.04 1.36 2.11 
SIZE 3,431 5.94 2.20 4.46 6.02 7.40 
REPEAT 3,431 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LITIGATION 3,413 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PROMINENCE 3,431 2.19 0.91 1.00 3.00 3.00 
3DAY_RETURN 3,047 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.02 
PRIOR_RETURN 3,047 0.08 0.56 -0.25 0.03 0.32 
POST_RETURN 3,047 0.00 0.13 -0.07 0.00 0.07 
SHARE_TURN 3,047 0.69 0.27 0.50 0.77 0.93 
FINANCIAL 3,431 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
4.02-8K 1 1.00            
|RS_ANI| 2 0.17 1.00           
|RS_A3NI| 3 0.18 0.66 1.00          
|RS_NQNI| 4 0.21 0.57 0.65 1.00         
|RS_N3QNI| 5 0.18 0.56 0.84 0.68 1.00        
|RS_ASALES| 6 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.24 1.00       
|RS_EQUITY| 7 0.16 0.33 0.44 0.53 0.44 0.45 1.00      
|RS_TA| 8 0.14 0.38 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.79 1.00     
TREND_A 9 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05 1.00    
LOSS_A 10 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.35 1.00   
TREND_Q 11 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.45 0.24 1.00  
LOSS_Q 12 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.65 0.35 1.00 
INCREASE 13 0.07 0.03 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
FRAUD 14 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
SEC 15 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
NUMBER 16 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
CORE 17 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 
PERIOD 18 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.09 
SEVERITY 19 0.31 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
AUDITOR 20 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.21 -0.05 -0.19 -0.02 -0.17 
QUALITY 21 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.33 -0.01 0.17 0.00 0.17 
PRACTICES 22 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 
AUDITOR_CHG 23 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.13 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.07 
LITIGATION_RISK 24 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.09 
DEBT_ISSUE 25 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
STOCK_ISSUE 26 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.10 
DEBT_MONITER 27 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.14 
STOCK_MONITER 28 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.16 0.02 -0.18 
INCENTIVE_RATIO 29 -0.08 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
LOG_HOLDINGS 30 -0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 -0.20 
CEO_CHG 31 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.00 
OVERCON_1 32 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.16 -0.01 -0.14 
OVERCON_2 33 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 
LOSS 34 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.16 -0.06 0.42 -0.03 0.39 
GROWTH 35 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.28 0.24 0.38 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.14 
SIZE 36 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.24 -0.24 -0.31 -0.04 -0.29 -0.02 -0.28 
REPEAT 37 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05 
LITIGATION 38 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 
PROMINENCE 39 0.94 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 
3DAY_RETURN 40 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
PRIOR_RETURN 41 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 
POST_RETURN 42 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 
SHARE_TURN 43 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 
FINANCIAL 44 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
INCREASE 13 1.00            
FRAUD 14 -0.05 1.00           
SEC 15 -0.01 0.08 1.00          
NUMBER 16 -0.02 0.14 0.04 1.00         
CORE 17 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.24 1.00        
PERIOD 18 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.01 1.00       
SEVERITY 19 -0.01 0.30 0.37 0.59 0.59 0.49 1.00      
AUDITOR 20 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.11 1.00     
QUALITY 21 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.24 1.00    
PRACTICES 22 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.12 1.00   
AUDITOR_CHG 23 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.11 -0.30 0.14 -0.00 1.00  
LITIGATION_RISK 24 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.02 1.00 
DEBT_ISSUE 25 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
STOCK_ISSUE 26 -0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.25 -0.02 0.02 0.06 
DEBT_MONITER 27 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.37 -0.15 -0.05 -0.15 -0.14 
STOCK_MONITER 28 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.44 -0.20 0.07 -0.16 0.07 
INCENTIVE_RATIO 29 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.20 0.37 -0.35 0.06 -0.01 
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LOG_HOLDINGS 30 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.01 0.13 -0.12 0.16 -0.05 0.05 
CEO_CHG 31 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.00 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
OVERCON_1 32 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.11 
OVERCON_2 33 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 
LOSS 34 0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.16 0.17 -0.09 0.06 0.08 
GROWTH 35 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.23 0.44 -0.08 0.09 0.10 
SIZE 36 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.08 0.15 0.07 0.57 -0.41 0.13 -0.25 -0.15 
REPEAT 37 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.00 
LITIGATION 38 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 
PROMINENCE 39 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.28 -0.10 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.07 
3DAY_RETURN 40 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
PRIOR_RETURN 41 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
POST_RETURN 42 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
SHARE_TURN 43 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.31 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.16 
FINANCIAL 44 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 0.18 -0.04 -0.28 
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
DEBT_ISSUE 25 1.00            
STOCK_ISSUE 26 0.75 1.00           
DEBT_MONITER 27 -0.01 -0.06 1.00          
STOCK_MONITER 28 0.00 -0.06 0.24 1.00         
INCENTIVE_RATIO 29 -0.04 0.45 0.06 -0.21 1.00        
LOG_HOLDINGS 30 0.02 -0.13 0.12 0.23 0.05 1.00       
CEO_CHG 31 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.09 -0.11 1.00      
OVERCON_1 32 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.38 -0.06 1.00     
OVERCON_2 33 0.05 0.04 0.25 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.04 1.00    
LOSS 34 0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.20 -0.04 -0.31 0.06 -0.21 0.01 1.00   
GROWTH 35 0.12 0.31 -0.16 -0.19 0.37 0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.13 1.00  
SIZE 36 -0.05 -0.18 0.59 0.51 -0.17 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.25 -0.30 -0.43 1.00 
REPEAT 37 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.01 
LITIGATION 38 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.10 
PROMINENCE 39 0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.10 
3DAY_RETURN 40 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 
PRIOR_RETURN 41 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.08 
POST_RETURN 42 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.38 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 
SHARE_TURN 43 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.42 -0.16 0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.28 
FINANCIAL 44 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.03 -0.12 -0.14 0.27 
  37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44     
REPEAT 37 1.00            
LITIGATION 38 0.05 1.00           
PROMINENCE 39 0.02 0.10 1.00          
3DAY_RETURN 40 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 1.00         
PRIOR_RETURN 41 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 1.00        
POST_RETURN 42 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.31 1.00       
SHARE_TURN 43 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 1.00      
FINANCIAL 44 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.21 1.00     
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation of the main variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. The values in bold are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
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Panel A of Table 3 presents the distribution of each restatement venue and the 
relative frequency of 4.02-8K restatements across different level of severity of restatements. 
As expected, the 4.02-8K restatement proportion is increasing as the restatement severity 
increases. Panel B and Panel C of Table 3 show that the proportion of 4.02-8K restatements 
is more widely spread when the misstated amount is zero or not available, which means 
that SEVERITY is functioning as a more critical non-reliance judgment criteria when 
quantitative information does not exist. 
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TABLE 3 
Restatement Venue Frequency Analysis 
Panel A: Full Sample 
SEVERITY Periodic Amended 4.02-8K Total 4.02-8K /Total 
0 674 314 589 1,577 37% 
1 378 101 709 1,188 60% 
2 97 40 368 505 73% 
3 11 4 120 135 89% 
4 1 1 18 20 90% 
5   6 6 100% 
Total  1,161   460   1,810   3,431  53% 
 
Panel B: Sample of |RS_ANI| > 0  
SEVERITY Periodic Amended 4.02-8K Total 4.02-8K /Total 
0 181 62 375 618 61% 
1 193 30 548 771 71% 
2 60 13 308 381 81% 
3 9 3 100 112 89% 
4   15 15 100% 
5   5 5 100% 
Total  443   108   1,351   1,902  71% 
 
Panel C: Sample of |RS_ANI| = 0 or NA 
SEVERITY Periodic Amended 4.02-8K Total 4.02-8K /Total 
0 493 252 214 959 22% 
1 185 71 161 417 39% 
2 37 27 60 124 48% 
3 2 1 20 23 87% 
4 1 1 3 5 60% 
5   1 1 100% 
Total  718   352   459   1,529  30% 
 
SEVERITY is an index variable that has value from 0 (least severe) to 5 (most severe).  “Periodic” is the 
restatements disclosed in 10-K or 10-Q filings, “Amended” is disclosed in 10-K/A or 10-Q/A filings.  
30 
 
In Table 4, I present the frequency of securities class action lawsuits by the 
prominence of restatement disclosure (Panel A), by the severity of restatements (Panel B), 
and by prior litigation risk of the industry (Panel C). LIT/N column shows that the 
proportion of lawsuits-related restatements monotonically increases as the disclosure 
prominence, restatements severity, and industry litigation risk increases. This trend does 
not change when dismissed cases are excluded from the total litigation, as illustrated in 
ND/LIT column. 
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TABLE 4 
Securities Class Action Lawsuits Frequency Analysis 
Panel A: by PROMINENCE  
PROMINENCE N LIT DIS LIT/N ND/N 
1 1,161 129 29 11.1% 8.6% 
2 460 66 22 14.3% 9.6% 
3 1,792 336 104 18.8% 12.9% 
Total 3,413 531 155 15.6% 11.0% 
 
Panel B: by SEVERITY  
SEVERITY N LIT DIS LIT/N ND/N 
0 1,576 191 50 12.1% 8.9% 
1 1,179 189 61 16.0% 10.9% 
2 500 109 35 21.8% 14.8% 
3 133 35 8 26.3% 20.3% 
4 20 5 1 25.0% 20.0% 
5 5 2 0 40.0% 40.0% 
Total 3,413 531 155 15.6% 11.0% 
 
Panel C: by Prior LITIGATION_RISK 
LITIGATION RISK N LIT DIS LIT/N ND/N 
0 2,466 346 90 14.0% 10.4% 
1 947 185 65 19.5% 12.7% 
Total 3,413 531 155 15.6% 11.0% 
 
N is the number of restatements related to securities class action lawsuits for each categories. LIT is the 
number of lawsuits-related restatements. DIS is the number of dismissed lawsuits. LIT/N is the proportion of 
lawsuits-related restatements. ND/N is the proportion of restatements related to Not-Dismissed lawsuits (ND 
= LIT-DIS). 19 restatements in the full sample are deleted because their litigation filing dates are earlier than 
4.02 8-K restatement filing dates. 
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4.2 Test of Research Question 
Table 5 reports the logistic regression results testing which variables are 
significantly associated with non-reliance judgments. Panel A includes only quantitative 
considerations; Panel B adds qualitative considerations, and Panel C combines the 
qualitative and quantitative considerations and additionally incorporates contextual and 
other control variables. Model specifications change according to the different independent 
variables adopted in each Model and Panel. 
Panel A in Table 5 presents the effect of seven different quantitative benchmarks 
on non-reliance judgment. Individually, all seven coefficients on each variable are 
significantly positive as expected. Following Acito et al. (2015), I also calculate and 
compare AUC scores of each model to evaluate seven individual proxies for the optimal 
model selection.20 AUC scores in Panel A range from 0.762 to 0.802 and |RS_N3QNI| 
scores the highest, consistent with AUC analysis result in Acito et al. (2015). Furthermore, 
when all variables are combined, the coefficients for annualized three-year quarterly net 
income is significantly positive and more sensitive compared to other benchmarks. 
Accordingly, I adopt |RS_N3QNI| for the single quantitative consideration measure. 
  
                                                 
20 AUC stands for the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Intuitively, ROC is a line 
that connects the true positive rate at the given false positive rate, and AUC measures the area under the ROC 
line. AUC score ranges from 0.5 for a perfect random model to 1 for a perfect model. Therefore, a comparison 
of AUC scores between different models enables the choice of more optimal model. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of Non-reliance Judgment 
Panel A: Quantitative Considerations 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
Independent 
variable  
Predicted 
sign 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Coeff.   p Coeff.   p Coeff.   p Coeff.   p 
|RS_ANI| + 0.412 *** 0.00          
|RS_A3NI| +    1.987 *** 0.00       
|RS_NQNI| +       1.809 *** 0.00    
|RS_N3QNI| +          2.496 *** 0.00 
|RS_ASALES| +             
|RS_EQUITY| +             
|RS_TA| +             
REPEAT ? 0.013  0.88 0.015  0.86 0.008  0.92 0.024  0.77 
Constant - -0.902 *** 0.00 1.007 *** 0.00 1.087 *** 0.00 0.964 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Sample size 3,137 3,137 3,135 3,137 
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.179 0.157 0.188 
AUC 0.768 0.794 0.776 0.802 
 
 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a Model 8a 
Coeff.   p Coeff.   p Coeff.   p Coeff.   p 
|RS_ANI| +          -0.007  0.46 
|RS_A3NI| +          -0.080  0.45 
|RS_NQNI| +          -0.308  0.21 
|RS_N3QNI| +          2.855 *** 0.00 
|RS_ASALES| + 0.425 *** 0.00       0.330 *** 0.00 
|RS_EQUITY| +    2.329 *** 0.00    1.116 ** 0.02 
|RS_TA| +       4.819 *** 0.00 -4.575 ** 0.01 
REPEAT ? 0.025  0.77 -0.010  0.90 -0.004  0.96 0.052  0.54 
Constant - 1.263 *** 0.00 1.193 *** 0.00 1.223 *** 0.00 0.946 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Sample size 3,072 3,137 3,137 3,070 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.145 0.139 0.196 
AUC 0.753 0.766 0.762 0.807 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Qualitative Considerations with Quantitative Considerations 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
Coeff.   p Coeff.   p Coeff.   p 
|RS_N3QNI| + 2.399 *** 0.00 2.177 *** 0.00 2.058 *** 0.00 
TREND_A ? -0.176 * 0.07    -0.198 ** 0.05 
LOSS_A ? 0.355 *** 0.00    0.408 *** 0.00 
TREND_Q ? 0.115  0.23    0.124  0.21 
LOSS_Q ? -0.111  0.32    -0.124  0.29 
INCREASE ? 0.336 *** 0.01    0.360 *** 0.00 
FRAUD +    1.222 ** 0.02 1.313 ** 0.02 
SEC +    0.951 *** 0.00 0.937 *** 0.00 
NUMBER +    -0.005  0.45 -0.003  0.94 
CORE +    0.197  0.08 0.201  0.16 
PERIOD +    0.068  0.12 0.092  0.12 
SEVERITY +    0.383 *** 0.00 0.376 *** 0.00 
REPEAT ? 0.005  0.95 -0.004  0.96 -0.028  0.75 
Constant - 0.879 *** 0.00 0.141  0.74 -0.092  0.83 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
Sample size 3,137 3,137 3,137 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.221 0.227 
AUC 0.802 0.815 0.817 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Other Considerations and Full model 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
|RS_N3QNI| +    2.454 *** 0.00 2.041 *** 0.00 
TREND_A ?       -0.186 * 0.05 
LOSS_A ?       0.460 *** 0.00 
INCREASE ?       0.417 *** 0.00 
FRAUD +       1.313 ** 0.02 
SEC +       0.980 *** 0.00 
NUMBER +       0.012  0.39 
CORE +       0.258 ** 0.04 
PERIOD +       0.087 * 0.08 
SEVERITY +       0.349 *** 0.00 
AUDITOR ? -0.012  0.91 -0.027  0.82 -0.040  0.76 
QUALITY ? -0.580  0.12 0.367  0.45 0.243  0.63 
PRACTICES ? 3.663 *** 0.00 3.167 *** 0.00 3.526 *** 0.00 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? 0.307 *** 0.00 0.191 * 0.08 0.071  0.54 
LITIGATION_RISK ? 0.065  0.48 0.101  0.33 -0.016  0.88 
DEBT_ISSUE ? 0.085  0.36 0.316 ** 0.02 0.281 * 0.06 
STOCK_ISSUE ? -0.032  0.71 -0.137  0.35 -0.115  0.48 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.318 *** 0.00 -0.364 *** 0.00 -0.442 *** 0.00 
STOCK_MONITER ? 0.286 *** 0.01 0.100  0.41 0.049  0.70 
LOSS ?    0.166 * 0.06 0.001  0.99 
GROWTH ?    -0.037  0.10 -0.041 * 0.08 
SIZE ?    0.072 ** 0.03 0.076 ** 0.03 
REPEAT ? 0.063  0.41 0.020  0.82 -0.016  0.86 
Constant - -0.954 *** 0.00 -1.074 *** 0.01 -2.082 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
Sample size 3,389 3,096 3,096 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.205 0.245 
AUC 0.732 0.807 0.826 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance for each regression coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed (one-tailed) t-statistics without (with) a predicted 
sign. All significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. AUC stands for the area under the ROC curve.  
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Table 5, Panel B documents that LOSS_A and INCREASE have positive effect on 
8-K disclosure venue choice, and FRAUD, SEC and SEVERITY variables in the second 
part of qualitative considerations have positive, significant coefficient as predicted.  
Panel C in Table 5 includes the contextual considerations that might have effect on 
firms’ disclosure venue choice. In contrast to Acito et al. (2009), most quantitative and 
quantitative considerations remain significant even after controlling for the industry’s 
accounting practices for 4.02-8K restatements disclosure choice (PRACTICES), indicating 
that firms apply their own criteria in addition to the general practices in the same industry. 
I also observe that firms place more weight on debt markets than equity market when it 
comes to making 4.02-8K disclosure choice. 
 
4.3 Subsample Test: No Quantitative Information Subsample 
Prior archival materiality literature removes observations if it could not evaluate 
the dollar amount of an error.21 However, Panel C in Table 3 shows that a significant 
portion of restatements have zero effect on previous net income or have no information 
available about the quantitative effect.22 Thus, I perform an additional test based on the 
subsample that has zero or NA value for the misstated amount (|RS_|) 
The logit regression result for Model 1a in Table 6, Panel A corroborates the initial 
findings of Table 3 about the importance of the severity of restatements when no 
quantitative information is available. Specifically, Model 1a shows that SEVERITY is 
insignificant when the misstated amount is zero, but Model 2a in Table 6 reports significant 
                                                 
21 Acito et al. (2009) drop firms “if the dollar amount of the error is indeterminate.” Keune and Johnstone 
(2012) include only firms that disclose misstatement amounts in their SAB 108 disclosure. 
22 Specifically, 45% of all restatements (1,529 out of 3,431) sample have zero or NA value for their misstated 
amount; 1,235 restatements have zero effect, and 294 restatements have no information available. 
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positive coefficient of SEVERITY when the misstated amount is zero or not available. 
Model 2a also reports that SEC investigation (SEC), the misstated period (PERIOD), and 
industry accounting practices (PRACTICES) are positively associated with non-reliance 
judgment, but the prior industry litigation risk has negative effect on 4.02-8K disclosure 
venue choice. 
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TABLE 6 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analyses 
Panel A: Subsample analyses 
Model 1a: sample with misstated amount = 0, Model 2a: sample with misstated amount 
= 0 or NA, Model 3a: restatements using periodic or amended disclosure venue 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K AMENDED 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
|RS_N3QNI| ?       -0.474 * 0.05 
TREND_A ? -0.108  0.52 -0.004  0.98 -0.131  0.44 
LOSS_A ? 0.419 ** 0.04 0.357 ** 0.04 0.251  0.19 
INCREASE ?       -0.802 *** 0.00 
FRAUD +          
SEC + 1.125 *** 0.00 0.883 *** 0.00 0.826 * 0.07 
NUMBER + 0.056  0.23 -0.036  0.29 -0.064  0.19 
CORE + 0.161  0.29 -0.147  0.27 -0.630 *** 0.02 
PERIOD + 0.341 *** 0.00 0.213 ** 0.01 -0.705 *** 0.00 
SEVERITY + 0.189  0.18 0.436 *** 0.01 0.103  0.32 
AUDITOR ? 0.259  0.28 0.031  0.87 -1.186 *** 0.00 
QUALITY ? 0.019  0.98 -0.344  0.59 -0.302  0.66 
PRACTICES ? 3.620 *** 0.00 3.961 *** 0.00 -1.824  0.10 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? -0.019  0.93 0.064  0.70 0.032  0.88 
LITIGATION_RISK ? -0.372 * 0.07 -0.408 ** 0.02 -0.187  0.36 
DEBT_ISSUE ? 0.171  0.52 -0.047  0.59 0.045  0.89 
STOCK_ISSUE ? 0.790  0.17 0.174  0.38 0.302  0.43 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.376 * 0.08 -0.350 * 0.06 0.406 * 0.07 
STOCK_MONITER ? -0.144  0.52 -0.058  0.74 -0.066  0.75 
LOSS ? -0.131  0.46 -0.162  0.30 -0.404 ** 0.03 
GROWTH ? -0.061  0.18 -0.036  0.23 0.023  0.56 
SIZE ? 0.031  0.61 0.006  0.90 -0.028  0.66 
REPEAT ? -0.062  0.68 0.035  0.78 0.224  0.16 
Constant ? -3.447 *** 0.00 -2.999 *** 0.00 6.906 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
Sample size 1,215 1,499 1,431 
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.153 0.309 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analyses 
Model 1b: restatements filed after 2007, Model 2b: restatements filed by unique firms, 
Model 3b: Sample with restriction of Model 1 and Model 2 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
|RS_N3QNI| + 2.920 *** 0.00 2.020 *** 0.00 3.624 *** 0.00 
TREND_A ? -0.162  0.20 -0.110  0.36 -0.109  0.53 
LOSS_A ? 0.693 *** 0.00 0.393 *** 0.01 0.715 *** 0.00 
INCREASE ? 0.256  0.12 0.518 *** 0.00 0.206  0.34 
FRAUD + 1.717 *** 0.01 1.739 ** 0.04 2.443 ** 0.03 
SEC + 2.205 *** 0.00 0.764 *** 0.01 2.110 *** 0.00 
NUMBER + -0.001  0.50 0.120 ** 0.01 0.096  0.12 
CORE + 0.375 ** 0.03 0.516 *** 0.00 0.781 *** 0.00 
PERIOD + 0.072  0.19 0.184 *** 0.01 0.226 ** 0.02 
SEVERITY + 0.140  0.19 0.226 * 0.05 -0.154  0.24 
AUDITOR ? -0.167  0.29 0.044  0.77 -0.043  0.83 
QUALITY ? 0.279  0.64 0.281  0.64 0.524  0.48 
PRACTICES ? 2.817 *** 0.00 4.074 *** 0.00 3.781 *** 0.00 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? 0.132  0.38 -0.041  0.77 0.021  0.92 
LITIGATION_RISK ? 0.099  0.48 0.018  0.89 0.016  0.93 
DEBT_ISSUE ? 0.366 ** 0.03 0.127  0.20 0.153  0.38 
STOCK_ISSUE ? -0.277  0.14 -0.029  0.79 -0.100  0.58 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.354 ** 0.03 -0.449 *** 0.00 -0.266  0.22 
STOCK_MONITER ? -0.143  0.39 0.095  0.54 -0.157  0.49 
LOSS ? 0.011  0.94 -0.030  0.81 -0.087  0.64 
GROWTH ? -0.058  0.13 -0.017  0.51 -0.028  0.48 
SIZE ? 0.005  0.90 0.079  0.07 -0.050  0.41 
REPEAT ? 0.051  0.66       
Constant - -1.943 *** 0.00 -3.317 *** 0.00 -3.236 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included 
Sample size 1,932 2,093 1,127 
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.260 0.279 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance for each regression coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed (one-tailed) t-statistics without (with) a predicted 
sign. All significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. INCREASE and FRAUD are not included in Panel A because of the lack of observation. In 
Model 2 and Model 3 of Panel B, the second and subsequent restatements by the same firm are deleted so 
that a firm appear only once in sample.  
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4.4 Subsample Test: Amended versus Periodic Restatements 
This paper does not focus on the different criteria for the restatements disclosure 
choice between the amended filings and the periodic filings, because this decision-making 
does not involve non-reliance judgments. However, Myers et al. (2013) argue that firms 
are hiding more severe restatements under periodic restatements, implying that there exists 
a systematic difference in decision-making process or contextual factors between periodic 
and amended restatements. Thus, I conduct additional logit regression using AMENDED 
variable as a dependent variable and the same control variables as in main analysis. 
Model 3a in Table 6 reports some results consistent with Myers et al. (2013); Firms 
are more likely to report quantitatively larger errors, core accounting issues, and errors that 
have a longer misstated period in periodic filings instead of in amended filings. At the same 
time, I also find that the accounting errors related to SEC investigation (SEC) are still more 
likely to be disclosed in amended filings, all else being equal.  
 
4.5 Sensitivity Test of Research Question 
The Audit Analytics reports that the number of restatements disclosed by firms 
increased by 69% right after the enactment of the Final rule, and dropped by 31% two years 
later (Audit Analytics 2014). The number of restatements disclosures remains stable after 
that.23 A sudden rise and fall of restatements can be attributed to several factors (Scholz 
2014). First, the outbreak of specific accounting issues around that time forced many firms 
to increase restatement-related disclosure filings. For example, significant portion of 
disclosure are related to option backdating scandals (Bernile and Jarrell 2009) and lease 
                                                 
23 The annual average restatements filings are 898 in last seven years and 843 in last three years. This trend 
is very similar to my sample frequency. 
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accounting issues (Acito et al. 2009) during that period. 24 Second, the SOX section 404 
enactment in Nov. 2004 precipitates the discovery of firms’ internal control weakness and 
its corrections through restatements. Third, a heightened regulatory environment after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) could induce firms’ over-reaction to the new regulation.  
Another issue for this type of an empirical study is that interpretation and 
accounting practices evolve over time after the adoption of new regulation. For example, 
the materiality judgment guideline undergoes major revision through SEC SAB 108 (Nov. 
2006). SAB 108 clarifies that firms should consider the cumulative effect of errors for 
materiality judgment, although the individual errors recognized for each period might be 
immaterial (Keune and Johnstone 2012). Another case is related to the change and 
clarification of SEC interpretation about new Form 8-K filing requirement (EY 2009).25 
Thus, one possible concerns about my research design is that transitional events 
might drive my findings. To mitigate this concern, I remove the restatements data disclosed 
between Aug. 2004 and Dec. 2006, and run the regression as a sensitivity test. 
Model 1b in Table 6 includes observations ranging from 2007 to 2013, and shows 
the similar results to that of the full sample, implying that the temporary surge of 
restatements right after the new regulation does not drive the main findings. 
Another sensitivity test is conducted to mitigate the concern that significant portion 
of restatements are repeatedly disclosed by the same firm, and these firms’ specific 
characteristics might drive the main findings of this paper. In fact, 56% of restatements are 
                                                 
24 “As of December 2006, at least 140 companies were under public scrutiny due to allegations that they 
engaged in illegal backdating of option grants” (Bernile and Jarrell 2009). And “Beginning in late 2004 
through mid-2006, more than 250 U.S. firms disclosed that the operating lease accounting methods they had 
been using violated generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)” (Acito et al. 2009) 
25 “The SEC staff has reiterated its preference, consistent with Question 1 of its November 2004 Form 8-K 
FAQs, that Item 4.02 events should be reported using Form 8-K, irrespective of whether the required 
information has been disclosed in a periodic report or elsewhere” (EY 2009). 
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filed by firms that restate their past financial statements more than once, and untabulated 
results shows that 247 firms restate their financial statements more than three times during 
the sample period.  
Model 2b of Panel B in Table 6 contains the first restatements filed by a firm and 
deletes its subsequent restatements, if any. The results are similar to the main findings and 
insensitive to the sample restriction to the unique firms. The last sensitivity test applies 
previous two restrictions at the same time, and the results reported in Model 3b are 
qualitatively similar to the previous sensitivity tests and the main findings, with the 
exception that all contextual and control variable except for PRACTICE become 
insignificant. 
 
4.6 Additional Test: Auditor Fixed Effect 
Acito et al. (2009) provide evidence that Big4 auditing firms are more likely to use 
out-of-period adjustments over formal restatements than non-Big4 auditing firms do, and 
each auditing firms have their own materiality thresholds. Adopting their research design, 
I investigate whether there exists difference between Big4 and non-Big4 auditing firms 
when it comes to making non-reliance judgments. 
Simple statistics about the frequency of 4.02-8K restatements show that Big4 
auditing firms use 4.02-8K restatements less frequently than non-Big4 firms.26 To examine 
further, I first run the logit analysis using four indicator variables for each Big4 auditing 
firm. Model 1a in Panel A of Table 7 reports that three (one) of the Big4 auditing firms are 
                                                 
26 51.8% (1,194 out of 2,306) of restatements are filed through 4.02-8K by firms having Big4 auditing firms, 
and 54.8% (616 out of 1,125) of restatements are filed by firms having non-Big4 auditing firms. 
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insignificantly (significantly) different from non-Big4 firms. 27  Additional Wald Chi-
square test to examine whether there exists a non-reliance judgment threshold difference 
between Big4 firms shows that the null hypothesis that all auditing firms use the same 
thresholds is rejected at 10% significance level. Model 1b uses only Big4 auditing firms 
and confirms the previous result that one of Big4 auditing firm is significantly less like to 
execute 4.02-8K filing compared to other three Big4 firms. 
 
  
                                                 
27 The auditing firm numbers are randomly assigned. 
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TABLE 7 
Additional Analyses 
Panel A: Auditor difference  
Model 1: full sample with big4 indicator variables, Model 2: big4 auditing firm only 
sample 
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1a Model 2a 
Coeff. p Coeff. p 
AUDITOR1 ? 0.000  1.00 0.357 ** 0.03 
AUDITOR2 ? -0.288 * 0.06    
AUDITOR3 ? 0.044  0.78 0.340 ** 0.03 
AUDITOR4 ? 0.074  0.65 0.415 ** 0.02 
Control variables Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included 
Sample size 3,096 2,174 
Pseudo R2 0.247 0.351 
Wald Chi-square test: 
H0: AUDITOR1=AUDITOR2=AUDITOR3=AUDITOR4=0, Chi2 (4)=7.78* (p=0.10) 
 
Panel B: CEO influence 
Model 1: OVERCON_1 for CEO overconfidence proxy, Model 2: OVERCON_2 for CEO 
overconfidence proxy  
Dependent variable 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Model 1b Model 2b 
Coeff. p Coeff. p 
INCENTIVE_RATIO ? -0.619  0.26 -0.492  0.37 
LOG_HOLDINGS ? 0.019  0.71 -0.009  0.85 
CEO_CHG ? -0.493 ** 0.05 -0.474 * 0.06 
OVERCON_1 ? -0.303  0.15    
OVERCON_2 ?    0.258  0.16 
Control variables Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included 
Sample size 1,124 1,124 
Pseudo R2 0.406 0.406 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel C: Before and After Analysis 
BEFORE: Jan. 2000 ~ Aug. 2004, AFTER_2004: Aug. 2004 ~ Dec. 2013, AFTER_2007: 
Jan. 2007 ~ Dec. 2013 
Dependent variable 8-K 4.02-8K 
  Predicted sign 
Before After_2004 After_2007 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
RS_N3QNI + 0.744 *** 0.00 1.295 *** 0.01 2.173 *** 0.00 
TREND_A ? -0.138  0.46 -0.048  0.82 -0.019  0.93 
LOSS_A ? -0.005  0.98 0.466 * 0.06 0.701 *** 0.01 
INCREASE ? 0.045  0.86 0.375  0.18 0.214  0.47 
FRAUD + -0.066  0.45 1.378 ** 0.05 1.782 ** 0.02 
SEC + 0.002  0.50 0.982 ** 0.01 2.207 *** 0.00 
NUMBER + -0.019  0.39 0.031  0.34 0.020  0.41 
CORE + 0.484 ** 0.04 -0.219  0.24 -0.096  0.39 
PERIOD + 0.191 * 0.05 -0.103  0.22 -0.117  0.21 
SEVERITY + 0.410 ** 0.03 -0.064  0.40 -0.275  0.16 
AUDITOR ? 0.398  0.16 -0.439  0.17 -0.570 * 0.09 
QUALITY ? -0.424  0.62 0.678  0.50 0.733  0.48 
PRACTICES ? 1.964  0.21 1.550  0.36 0.815  0.65 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? -0.051  0.78 0.123  0.58 0.187  0.44 
LITIGATION_RISK ? 0.023  0.91 -0.040  0.87 0.075  0.77 
DEBT_ISSUE ? -0.107  0.69 0.388  0.21 0.475  0.14 
STOCK_ISSUE ? 0.034  0.95 -0.150  0.80 -0.311  0.61 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.363  0.14 -0.077  0.78 0.014  0.96 
STOCK_MONITER ? 0.614 *** 0.01 -0.563 ** 0.03 -0.758 *** 0.01 
LOSS ? 0.227  0.30 -0.219  0.36 -0.207  0.42 
GROWTH ? -0.019  0.68 -0.021  0.69 -0.039  0.51 
SIZE ? 0.187 *** 0.01 -0.111  0.16 -0.180 ** 0.03 
REPEAT ? -0.075  0.35       
AFTER + 2.559 ** 0.03       
Constant - -5.570 *** 0.00       
Year Fixed Effect Included Included 
Sample size 3816 2652 
Pseudo R2 0.236 0.231 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance for each regression coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed (one-tailed) t-statistics without (with) a predicted 
sign. All significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors corrected for firm-level 
clustering. AFTER_2004 (AFTER_2007) column measures the incremental effect of an independent 
variable after the SEC Final rule (after year 2007) compared to before the SEC Final rule.  
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4.7 Additional Test: CEO influence 
The CEO is one of the key decision makers in an important accounting issue such 
as a restatement.28 However, whether and under what condition CEO exercises influence 
over restatements decision making remain unanswered. Therefore, I include three variables 
widely adopted in accounting literature to account for the effect of CEO on a firm’s 
accounting choices: CEO incentives, CEO turnover, and CEO overconfidence. 
First, the CEO incentive structure tied to the stock performance might be associated 
with disclosure venue choice of firm. Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), I 
include CEO_INCENTIVES, the incentive ratio that captures a CEO’s normalized 
compensation increases in response to 1% point increase in the firms’ share price. At the 
same time, to adjust for differential size effect of equity-based compensation, I include the 
natural log of the sum of in-the-money option value and share compensation 
(CEO_LOGHOLDINGS).29 
Second, CEO turnover might increase the probability of reviewing prior accounting 
practices and disclosing them in timely and prominent way to attribute the prior errors to 
former CEO. In contrast, as Plumlee and Yohn (2014) predict and find, the restatements 
after CEO turnover might be less likely to be associated with transparent disclosure because 
the errors in prior CEO tenure are no longer relevant to financial statements users. To 
                                                 
28 Keune and Johnstone (2012) analyze the interaction of managers, auditors, and audit committees in 
association with materiality judgments and the resolution of detected errors.  Although the interaction 
between manager and auditor is not a primary research focus, I include an indicator variable for clients of 
Big4 auditors and capital market monitoring variables to control for the different incentives of auditors and 
managers. 
29 This variable also controls for the effect of compensation incentives on the overconfidence because the 
option exercise delay may be “mechanically related to the CEO’s total holdings in the firm” (Schrand and 
Zechman 2012). 
47 
 
resolve these conflicting predictions, I include CEO turnover indicator variable 
(CEO_CHG) for this additional test. 
Third, the specific characteristics of the CEO might have systematic effect on 
disclosure venue choice. Accounting and behavioral finance literature documents the effect 
of individual psychology on various corporate decisions such as investment, managerial 
forecast, and financial reporting (Hribar and Yang 2014). For instance, Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) evidence that overconfident executives are more likely to be involved 
with intentional restatement due to their optimistic bias about firms’ future performance. 
However, whether the overconfidence trait might affect materiality and non-reliance 
judgment is open questions.  
Following Schrand and Zechman (2012), I construct two proxies to measure the 
overconfidence of the CEO. The first proxy, CEO_OVER1, is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if CEO’s unexercised option is greater than the same industry median, and 0 
otherwise. The second proxy, CEO_OVER2, is also indicator variable having value of 1 if 
at least three of five criteria are satisfied.30  
Panel B in Table 7 summarizes the effect of three CEO related variables on non-
reliance judgment. All sample statistics reported in Table 2 are similar to Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) and Schrand and Zechman (2012). Model 1b and Model 2b are different 
in that each model uses different CEO overconfidence measures. All control variables 
including quantitative consideration are included but not reported separately. The results 
indicate that CEO incentives and overconfidence seem to have no effect on firms’ non-
                                                 
30 1. Industry-adjusted excess investment is above the median, 2. Industry-adjusted net acquisitions is above 
the median, 3. Industry-adjusted debt to equity ratio is above the median, 4. Either convertible debt or 
preferred stock is used, and 5. Dividend payout ratio is positive. 
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reliance judgment about prior errors. However, consistent with Plumlee and Yohn (2014), 
I find that non-reliance judgment is less likely to occur when CEO of misstated period 
departures the company, implying that CEO turnover contributes to gaining the investors’ 
reliance on financial statements at least from firms’ perspective. 
 
4.8 Additional Test: Before and After Analysis 
The nature of Form 8-K disclosure changes from the voluntary to mandatory 
disclosure venue through which a firm reveals its initial discovery of an error and plausible 
future restatement. To find empirical evidence to support this argument, I expand my data 
period to the Jan. 2000 and compare the determinants that drive 8-K disclosure before the 
Final rule and 4.02-8K disclosure after the Final rule. 8-K is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if a firm use Form 8-K to disclosure restatement, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
β (α) measure the effect (the differential effect) of each individual variables on the 
likelihood of 8-K (4.02 8-K) disclosure venue choice before the Final rule (after the Final 
rule). 
P(8-K) = f (β0 + β1QUANTITATIVE + β2QUALITATIVE1 + β3QUALITATIVE2 + 
β4CONTEXTUAL + β5OTHER CONTROL + α0 +          
α1QUANTITATIVE + α2QUALITATIVE1 + α3QUALITATIVE2 + 
α4CONTEXTUAL + α5OTHER CONTROL + Year Fixed Effects + ε)           (4) 
Panel C in Table 7 presents the before and after analysis results. Several results 
indicate the disclosure regime changes from discretion to requirement. First, the 
quantitative criteria have significantly positive effect even before the Final rule, as 
expected. However, the size of the coefficient significantly increases after the Final rule, 
meaning that firms place more weight on the quantitative consideration threshold because 
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the quantitative benchmark is the first and foremost criteria to meet under the mandatory 
regime. Second, restatements related to the fraud and SEC investigation are more likely to 
be disclosed on Form 8-K after the Final rule, implying that firms become more sensitive 
to issues related to the regulatory body. In contrast, qualitative considerations related to 
accounting errors such as CORE, PERIOD, and SEVERITY become less significant after 
the Final rule. Third, stock market monitoring effect works the other way after the Final 
rule, showing that firms’ voluntary incentive to provide information to stock market 
significantly decreases under mandatory disclosure regime. 
To mitigate the concern of the transitional period, I report the sensitivity test results 
in the third column (After_2007). The results are similar to main analysis results in second 
column.31 
 
4.9 Test of Hypothesis 
Table 8 reports the effect of 4.02-8K disclosure on the future securities class action 
lawsuits after controlling for the restatements characteristics, contextual and other control 
variables related to the restatements, and stock market response control variables as well 
as endogeneity issue of firms’ opportunistic disclosure choice by adopting Heckman’s two 
stage model.  
As the litigation stage unfolds, some lawsuits are terminated at the request of 
plaintiffs or by the determination of a judge prior to the trial process because the litigation 
becomes less likely to win after the discovery of new evidence or because of negligible 
legal merit to continue the case. Previous literature about the association between 
                                                 
31 For simplicity, the before analysis result of After_2007 is not reported, but the results is almost identical 
to the first column. 
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accounting events and litigation risk usually performs robustness tests after deleting 
dismissed cases (e.g., Files et al. 2009). Following this research design, I search the 
dismissed cases from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(http://securities.stanford.edu) and report the results in the separate column (ND_CASES) 
after deleting dismissed cases. 
The first stage regression results are exactly same as Model 3c in Table 5. The 
Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on this first stage regression prediction and added 
to the second stage regression as one of control variables. Table 8 presents the second stage 
regression. The current stock market response (3DAY_RETURN) and stock turnover 
(SHARE_TURN) have significant effect on future litigation risk in predicted direction.32  
  
                                                 
32 In an untabulated sensitivity test, I use litigations filed within one year after the restatements announcement, 
and find qualitatively similar results. 
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TABLE 8 
4.02-8K Restatements and Litigation Risk 
Panel A: Main analysis  
Dependent variable LITIGATION 
  Predicted 
sign 
ALL_CASES ND_CASES 
  Coeff. p Coeff. p 
4.02-8K + 0.213 * 0.07 0.099  0.27 
|RS_N3QNI| + 0.007  0.44 0.040  0.20 
FRAUD + -0.204  0.31 0.024  0.48 
SEC ? -0.221  0.40 -0.543 * 0.09 
NUMBER + -0.003  0.48 -0.008  0.45 
CORE + 0.010  0.48 0.031  0.44 
PERIOD + -0.014  0.44 -0.054  0.29 
SEVERITY + 0.136  0.17 0.151  0.17 
AUDITOR ? -0.210  0.28 -0.263  0.24 
QUALITY ? 0.876  0.15 1.195 * 0.07 
PRACTICES ? -0.850  0.47 -0.204  0.88 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? 0.213  0.21 0.249  0.16 
LITIGATION_RISK ? 0.285 * 0.06 0.024  0.91 
DEBT_ISSUE ? -0.094  0.36 -0.434  0.12 
STOCK_ISSUE ? 0.069  0.84 0.066  0.86 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.265  0.18 -0.269  0.25 
STOCK_MONITER ? 0.241  0.35 0.256  0.40 
LOSS ? -0.192  0.14 -0.279 * 0.07 
GROWTH ? 0.075 * 0.06 0.075  0.10 
SIZE ? 0.179 *** 0.00 0.155 ** 0.03 
REPEAT ? 0.289 ** 0.03 0.453 *** 0.00 
3DAY_RETURN - -4.778 *** 0.00 -4.898 *** 0.00 
PRIOR_RETURN - -0.116  0.17 -0.124  0.20 
POST_RETURN - -0.134  0.38 -0.512  0.14 
SHARE_TURN + 2.910 *** 0.00 2.955 *** 0.00 
FINANCIAL ? 0.259  0.26 0.380  0.14 
INVERSEMILLS ? -1.828  0.12 -2.607 ** 0.05 
Constant - -3.990 *** 0.00 -3.700 *** 0.01 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included 
Sample size 2,866 2,728 
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.130 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analysis  
Subsamples AFTER_2007 UNIQUE_FIRMS BOTH_REST 
Dependent variable LITIGATION 
 Predicted sign 
ALL_CASES ND_CASES ALL_CASES ND_CASES ALL_CASES ND_CASES 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
4.02-8K + 0.265 * 0.07 0.152  0.23 0.383 ** 0.01 0.358 ** 0.04 0.482 ** 0.02 0.539 ** 0.03 
|RS_N3QNI| + -0.066  0.20 -0.024  0.38 0.034  0.25 0.075 ** 0.05 -0.104  0.15 -0.071  0.27 
SEVERITY + 0.300 * 0.06 0.263 * 0.10 0.220 * 0.09 0.276 * 0.08 0.611 ** 0.01 0.658 ** 0.02 
SIZE ? 0.110  0.16 0.108  0.24 0.233 *** 0.00 0.215 *** 0.00 0.144  0.11 0.143  0.15 
REPEAT ? 0.142  0.42 0.377 * 0.07             
3DAY_RETURN - -4.103 *** 0.00 -3.949 *** 0.00 -5.595 *** 0.00 -5.848 *** 0.00 -4.614 *** 0.00 -4.257 *** 0.00 
SHARE_TURN + 3.567 *** 0.00 3.537 *** 0.00 2.679 *** 0.00 2.654 *** 0.00 3.283 *** 0.00 3.211 *** 0.00 
INVERSEMILLS ? -2.301 ** 0.05 -3.353 *** 0.01 -0.847  0.51 -1.145  0.43 -1.670  0.20 -2.768 * 0.07 
Constant - -3.071 ** 0.02 -2.751 * 0.06 -4.963 *** 0.00 -4.927 *** 0.00 -2.620 * 0.06 -1.488  0.23 
Control variables  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Sample size  1,810 1,737 1,925 1,820 1,052 1,002 
Pseudo R2   0.150 0.142 0.139 0.133 0.165 0.150 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance for each regression coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
(one-tailed) t-statistics without (with) a predicted sign. All significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
ALL_CASES (ND_CASES) includes (excludes) dismissed cases. AFTER_2007 includes restatements filed after 2007. UNIQUE_FIRMS includes the first 
restatement filed by a firm and delete the second and subsequent restatements, if any. BOTH_REST applies both restrictions at the same time.
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Consistent with limited attention theory and the findings of File et al (2009), I find 
a positive association between 4.02-8K restatements disclosure venue and future class 
action litigation risk. This finding implies that 4.02-8K disclosure venue choice instead of 
10-K (Q) or 10-K/A (Q/A) venue is associated with about 24% (=exp(0.213)-1) increase 
in the odds of a future class action lawsuit, holding all other variables constant. Meanwhile, 
the analysis of not-dismissed litigations sample in the next column indicates that 4.02-8K 
restatements have no effect on the likelihood of future lawsuits, meaning that 4.02-8K 
venue choice only increases the possibility of frivolous litigation without generating 
serious legal consequences. However, contrary to the prior section results (e.g., Table 5), 
REPEAT variable have significant effect in both regression, implying that unobservable 
characteristics of firms that repeat restatements might drive this insignificant results. Thus, 
whether specific firms’ characteristics are omitted but correlated with litigation risk is an 
empirical question.  
To answer this question and perform a sensitivity test, I use three subsamples as in 
my research question section. Specifically, I first delete restatements observations between 
Aug. 2004 and Dec. 2006, and report the results in AFTER_2007 column in Panel B of 
Table 8. All independent variables in Panel A regression are included, but not reported for 
simplicity. The results is similar to main results in Panel A in that REPEAT is significant 
while 4.02-8K is not significant for ND_CASES, implying that the specific time period has 
no explanatory power. 
UNIQUE_FIRMS column in Table 8 presents the two-stage logit regression 
analysis using the unique firm sample after deleting the second and subsequent 
restatements filed by the same firm. Further, the sample selected by prior two restrictions 
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at the same time is analyzed and presented in BOTH_REST column. The coefficients of 
4.02-8K are all significantly positive, even in the cases excluding dismissed litigation, 
confirming that the disclosure venue choice has significant effect on future litigation risk 
even in the restricted sample, and restatement-repeating firms are accountable for the 
dismissed cases.  
The effect of 4.02-8K disclosure on the increasing likelihood of future litigation 
seemingly speaks to the possibility that firms may choose to shun the requirement of the 
Final rule to lower the litigation cost, consistent with frequency analysis in Panel C of Table 
1. Alternatively, firms’ potential opportunistic disclosure choice behavior might also come 
from the safer harbor clause in the Final rule.33 According to this clause, firms shall not be 
deemed to violate the Rule 10B-5 (e.g., fraud or deceit) under the Securities Exchange Act 
for the failure to report Item 4.02 event on Form 8-K.34 Although this is the case, my main 
finding about 4.02-8K disclosure effect on litigation risk is not be affected. However, 
further research is warranted to understand the role of safe harbor on firms’ disclosure 
decision making. 
 
4.10 Additional Test: Prominence of Disclosure Venue 
The effect of different prominence of restatements disclosure on litigation risk is 
reported in Table 9. Using multinomial logit regression, I first estimate two first-stage 
regressions using periodic restatements as base outcome. In untabulated results, the first 
                                                 
33 A safer harbor is adopted under Regulation FD to protect managers from potential legal liabilities arising 
from the forward looking statements. The SEC recognizes the similarity between Regulation FD and new 
Form 8-K requirement in that “the new Form 8-K disclosure items may require management to quickly assess 
the materiality of an event or to determine whether a disclosure obligation has been triggered (SEC 2004a),” 
and decides to endow the similar legal protection for several items on Form 8-K including item 4.02.  
34 “The safe harbor only applies to a failure to file a report on Form 8-K. Thus, material misstatements or 
omissions in a Form 8-K will continue to be subject to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability” (SEC 2004a). 
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(second) logit regression estimates the effect of one unit increase of independent variable 
for amended (4.02-8K) restatements relative to periodic restatements while all other things 
being held constant. 35  I predict the probability of each disclosure venue choice, and 
construct two Inverse Mills Ratios and include them in the second stage logit regression to 
control for the endogeneity problem of firms’ disclosure choice. 
The results are qualitatively similar to that of main regression. The positive and 
significant coefficient of PROMINENCE in ALL_CASES in Panel A indicates that more 
prominent disclosure venue would increase the odds of future litigation risk by 16.3% 
(=exp(0.151)-1). As in Panel A of Table 8, ND_CASES is insignificant due to the effect 
of restatements repeating firms. However, the effect of prominent disclosure on litigation 
risk becomes significant after eliminating repetitive firm observations.  
These findings are robust to the exclusion of the first two-year observations and the 
elimination of the second and subsequent restatements by the same firm. The detailed 
regression results are provided in Panel B of Table 9. The incremental litigation risk for 
the prominent disclosure ranges from 15% to 30% depending on different sample 
specification. 
  
                                                 
35 The first (second) logit regression is qualitatively similar to the Model 3a in Table 6 (Model 3c in Table 
5). 
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TABLE 9 
Disclosure Prominence and Litigation Risk 
Panel A: Main analysis  
Dependent variable LITIGATION 
  Predicted 
sign 
ALL_CASES ND_CASES 
  Coeff. p Coeff. p 
PROMINENCE + 0.151 ** 0.03 0.076  0.21 
|RS_N3QNI| + 0.602 * 0.09 0.532  0.15 
FRAUD + 7.305 *** 0.01 8.286 *** 0.01 
SEC ? -0.500  0.28 -1.013 * 0.08 
NUMBER + 0.027  0.30 0.009  0.44 
CORE + 0.444 ** 0.03 0.639 ** 0.02 
PERIOD + 0.320 ** 0.02 0.369 ** 0.03 
SEVERITY + 0.233 * 0.07 0.238 * 0.09 
AUDITOR ? 0.378  0.29 0.510  0.26 
QUALITY ? 1.172 ** 0.05 1.555 ** 0.02 
PRACTICES ? 0.943  0.44 1.973  0.18 
AUDOTOR_CHG ? 0.296 ** 0.05 0.228  0.18 
LITIGATION_RISK ? 0.286 * 0.10 0.099  0.64 
DEBT_ISSUE ? -0.067  0.60 -0.440  0.12 
STOCK_ISSUE ? 0.051  0.88 0.080  0.83 
DEBT_MONITER ? -0.596 *** 0.01 -0.598 ** 0.02 
STOCK_MONITER ? 0.339  0.20 0.418  0.18 
LOSS ? 0.037  0.80 -0.049  0.77 
GROWTH ? 0.050  0.22 0.043  0.35 
SIZE ? 0.238 *** 0.00 0.209 *** 0.01 
REPEAT ? 0.189  0.18 0.334 ** 0.04 
3DAY_RETURN - -4.652 *** 0.00 -4.716 *** 0.00 
PRIOR_RETURN - -0.141  0.12 -0.131  0.18 
POST_RETURN - -0.117  0.39 -0.493  0.15 
SHARE_TURN + 2.858 *** 0.00 2.877 *** 0.00 
FINANCIAL ? 0.250  0.28 0.379  0.14 
INVERSEMILLS1 ? -0.126  0.34 -0.233  0.15 
INVERSEMILLS2 ? 0.272 ** 0.01 0.314 ** 0.02 
Constant - -8.228 *** 0.00 -9.387 *** 0.00 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included 
Sample size 2,860 2,720 
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.132 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analysis  
Subsamples AFTER_2007 UNIQUE_FIRMS BOTH_REST 
Dependent variable LITIGATION 
 Predicted sign 
ALL_CASES ND_CASES ALL_CASES ND_CASES ALL_CASES ND_CASES 
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p 
PROMINENCE + 0.143 * 0.07 0.094  0.21 0.209 ** 0.02 0.195 * 0.06 0.197 * 0.06 0.263 ** 0.05 
|RS_N3QNI| + 1.772 *** 0.01 1.633 ** 0.02 0.173  0.38 -0.242  0.36 2.454 *** 0.01 2.002 ** 0.05 
SEVERITY + 0.284 * 0.08 0.255  0.11 0.362 ** 0.02 0.409 ** 0.03 0.854 *** 0.00 0.886 *** 0.01 
SIZE ? 0.178 ** 0.04 0.168 * 0.09 0.245 *** 0.00 0.190 *** 0.01 0.139  0.12 0.113  0.27 
REPEAT ? 0.184  0.30 0.417 ** 0.04             
3DAY_RETURN - -3.972 *** 0.00 -3.742 *** 0.00 -5.423 *** 0.00 -5.579 *** 0.00 -4.236 *** 0.00 -3.536 ** 0.01 
SHARE_TURN + 3.501 *** 0.00 3.443 *** 0.00 2.635 *** 0.00 2.586 *** 0.00 3.190 *** 0.00 3.123 *** 0.00 
INVERSEMILLS1 ? -0.015  0.91 -0.057  0.70 -0.214  0.18 -0.448 ** 0.03 -0.067  0.68 -0.173  0.36 
INVERSEMILLS2 ? 0.297 ** 0.02 0.943 ** 0.04 0.277 ** 0.02 0.373 ** 0.01 0.383 ** 0.02 0.407 ** 0.03 
Constant - -6.666 *** 0.00 -7.099 *** 0.00 -9.078 *** 0.00 -11.22 *** 0.00 -5.920 *** 0.00 -6.113 *** 0.00 
Control variables  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Sample size  1,807 1,734 1,922 1,817 1,048   998 
Pseudo R2   0.154 0.144 0.142 0.139 0.175 0.160 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance for each regression coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
(one-tailed) t-statistics without (with) a predicted sign. All significance levels are calculated based on robust standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering. 
ALL_CASES (ND_CASES) includes (excludes) dismissed cases. AFTER_2007 includes restatements filed after 2007. UNIQUE_FIRMS includes the first 
restatement filed by a firm and delete the second and subsequent restatements, if any. BOTH_REST applies both restrictions at the same time. 
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
Reliability is an essential requirement for accounting information reported in 
financial statements. However, little is known about the unique case where firms have to 
declare that their financial statements should not be relied upon because of their own errors 
using a distinct and separate form. 
Recent papers about firms’ materiality judgment investigate SEC comment letters 
(Acito et al. 2015) and the internal materiality judgment guidance of the major accounting 
firms (Eilifsen and Messier 2015) to provide empirical evidence about the materiality 
judgment criteria firms and their auditors are using. Although the non-reliance judgment is 
related to materiality judgment, the immediate and prominent disclosure requirement of 
Item 4.02 in Form 8-K makes non-reliance judgment quite different from general 
materiality judgment.  
Notwithstanding its importance and uniqueness, the general criteria of this non-
reliance judgement is not documented yet. Using a comprehensive restatements database, 
I investigate the implied criteria firms use to make non-reliance judgment about the errors 
in their past financial statements.  
In this paper, I find that firms’ non-reliance judgments vary primarily in 
conjunction with quantitative and qualitative considerations, while other contextual 
considerations have a limited influence on this judgment. Specifically, annualized three-
year quarterly net income is the significant quantitative criteria for firms’ non-reliance 
judgment. Additionally, qualitative considerations such as the annual income trend (LOSS) 
and restatements characteristics also have significant effect on non-reliance judgment. 
Restatement characteristics except for the number of restatement reasons (NUMBER) are 
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all significant in explaining the judgment. Among the contextual considerations, industry 
accounting practice about 4.02-8K restatement, debt market considerations, and firm size 
have significant effect on the judgment. In contrast to Myers et al. (2013), I find that the 
contextual considerations have limited effect on 4.02-8K disclosure choice in restricted 
sample. 
The non-reliance criteria I identified allow me to estimate the likelihood of 4.02-
8K restatement disclosure choice, and calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio to control for the 
tendency of firms to select less prominent disclosure venues to avoid future litigation risk. 
Adopting the Heckman two-stage model, I find that a pronounced restatement disclosure 
venue such as 4.02-8K is more likely to be associated with future litigation risk after 
controlling for the magnitude of restatements and endogeneity issues, which sheds some 
light on the current popularity of non 4.02-8K restatements. This finding can be 
generalizable to sample that utilizes the three different prominent disclosure venues: 
periodic, amended, and 4.02-8K disclosure venue. 
This paper provides the first empirical evidence about the determinants of firms’ 
non-reliance judgment. This finding lays theoretical foundation for testing the effect of 
prominent disclosure on future litigation risk. For future research, the role of safe harbor 
on management disclosure decision-making, the market consequence of firms’ non-
reliance judgment, and the association between the specific characteristics of management 
and non-reliance judgement making might be potential research topics. Further, the SEC 
may want to provide detailed guideline about the non-reliance judgment to curb the firms’ 
opportunistic disclosure venue choice. 
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APPENDIX:  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
DEPENDENT variables 
4.02-8K Indicator variable that equals 1 if a restatement is disclosed in Item 4.02 
Form 8-K, and 0 if a restatement is disclosed in “Amended” or 
“Periodic” SEC filings. 
AMENDED Indicator variable that equals 1 if restatement is disclosed in 10-K/A or 
10-Q/A filings, and 0 if restatement is disclosed in “Periodic” 10-K or 
10-Q SEC filings. 
LITIGATION Indicator variable that equals 1 if a restatement causes a securities class 
action lawsuits, and 0 otherwise. 
QUANTITATIVE Consideration 
|RS_ | Absolute value of the misstated amount, which is the sum of changes in 
net income for all periods affected by a restatement. Zero is assigned if 
there is no impact, and missing value is assigned if the amount is not 
available. 
|RS_ANI| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by the absolute value of annual net 
income reported at the beginning of fiscal year in which restatement 
occurred. 
|RS_A3NI| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by one third of the sum of 3 
absolute values of annual net income reported before the fiscal year in 
which restatement occurred. 
|RS_NQNI| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by "normalized" quarterly net 
income, defined as larger of quarterly net income multiplied by 4 or 5% 
of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal quarter in which restatement 
occurred.  
|RS_N3QNI| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by one third of the sum of 12 
absolute values of quarterly net income reported before the fiscal 
quarter in which restatement occurred. 
|RS_ASALES| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by sales reported at the beginning of 
fiscal year in which restatement occurred. 
|RS_EQUITY| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by equities reported at the 
beginning of fiscal year in which restatement occurred. 
|RS_TA| Aggregate misstated amount scaled by total assets reported at the 
beginning of fiscal year in which restatement occurred. 
QUALITATIVE1 consideration – net income trends 
TREND_A Indicator variable that equals 1 if net income at the end of fiscal year in 
which restatement occurred is less than that of previous fiscal year, and 
0 otherwise. 
LOSS_A Indicator variable that equals 1 if net income at the end of fiscal year in 
which restatement occurred is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
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TREND_Q Indicator variable that equals 1 if net income at the end of quarter in 
which restatement occurred is less than that of the previous year's same 
quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS_Q Indicator variable that equals 1 if net income at the end of quarter in 
which restatement occurred is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
INCREASE Indicator variable that equals 1 if restatement increases net income, and 
0 otherwise. 
QUALITATIVE2 consideration - restatement characteristics 
FRAUD Indicator variable that equals 1 if restatement identifies fraud, 
irregularities, and 0 otherwise. 
SEC Indicator variable that equals 1 if restatement identifies SEC 
investigation, and 0 otherwise. 
NUMBER The number of distinctive restatement reasons identified as accounting 
rule application failures, frauds, or errors. 
CORE Indicator variable that equals 1 if restatement is related to core accounts 
(revenue, expense, cost of goods sold), and 0 otherwise. 
PERIOD Natural log of days of period that is affected by the restatement. 
SEVERITY Index variable that takes on value from 0 to 5, which is the sum of two 
indicator variables that equal 1 if NUMBER or PERIOD is above 75% 
of each variable, and existing three indicator variables - FRAUD, SEC, 
and CORE. 
CONTEXTUAL consideration 
AUDITOR Indicator variable that equals 1 if one of big four auditors is a auditor at 
the restatement filing date. 
QUALITY The absolute value of abnormal accruals, which are estimated in the 
cross-section for each year and 2-digit SIC code using modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995) and measured at the beginning of fiscal 
year in which restatement occurred. 
PRACTICES The proportion of 8-K disclosure announcement in the 2-digit SIC code 
industry during the sample period. 
AUDITOR_CHG Indicator variable that equals 1 if an outside auditing firm at the time of 
restatement announcement is different from one during the misstated 
period, and 0 otherwise. 
LITIGATION_RISK Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm belongs to high litigation risk 
industry based on SIC code classification from Francis et al. (1994), and 
0 otherwise. 
DEBT_ISSUE Three-year average of long term debt issuance (DLTIS in 
COMPUSTAT) divided by total asset surrounding the restatement 
announcement year. 
STOCK_ISSUE Three-year average of stock issuance (SSTK in COMPUSTAT) divided 
by total asset surrounding the restatement announcement year. 
DEBT_MONITER Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has an S&P domestic short- or 
long-term issuer credit rating during one year prior to restatement filing 
date, and 0 otherwise. 
STOCK_MONITER Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is covered by at least one 
analysts in I/B/E/S consensus forecast data during one year prior to 
restatement filing date, and 0 otherwise. 
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CEO incentives 
CEO_INCENTIVES The incentive ratio that captures a CEO’s normalized compensation 
increase in response to 1% increase in the share price, which is 
measured as ONEPCT/(ONEPCT + SALARY +BONUS) (Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006). ONEPCT  is the increase of CEO compensation 
based on stock (SHARE) and options (OPTIONS) holdings  in response 
to 1% increase of a firm’s stock price (PRICE), which is equal to 
0.01*PRICE*(SHARE+OPTIONS) 
CEO_LOGHOLDINGS Natural log of CEO’s equity-based compensation, which is equal to the 
sum of in-the-money options and SHARE (Schrand and Zechman, 
2012) 
CEO_CHG Indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO at the time of restatement 
announcement is different from one during the misstated period, and 0 
otherwise. 
CEO_OVER1 CEO overconfidence indicator variable type 1 that equals 1 if the 
natural log of CEO’s in-the-money unexercised exercisable options + 1 
is greater than the industry median, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_OVER2 CEO overconfidence indicator variable type 2 that equals 1 if at least 
three of five criteria are met; 1. Industry-adjusted excess investment is 
above the median, 2. Industry-adjusted net acquisitions is above the 
median, 3. Industry-adjusted debt to equity ratio is above the median, 4. 
Either convertible debt or preferred stock is used, 5. Dividend payout 
ratio is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
OTHER CONTROL variables 
LOSS Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm recorded loss in last three fiscal 
years before restatement, 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH Market-to-book ratio as growth opportunity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year in which restatement occurred. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year in which 
restatement occurred. 
REPEAT Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm file restatement more than once 
during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. 
LITIGATION variables 
PROMINENCE Index variable that equals 3 (high prominence) for restatements 
disclosed in item 4.02 Form 8-K, 2 (medium prominence) for 
restatements disclosed in amended SEC filing (e.g., 10-K/A or 10-Q/A), 
and 1 (low prominence) for restatements disclosed in periodic SEC 
filing (e.g., 10-K or 10-Q). 
3DAY_RETURN Compounded raw returns over the 3-day return around the restatement 
filing date. 
PRIOR_RETURN Compounded raw returns over one year before the restatement filing 
date, which ends at two days before the restatement filing date. 
POST_RETURN Compounded raw returns over 20 days after the restatement filing date, 
which starts at two days after the restatement filing date. 
SHARE_TURN Probability that a share is traded for one year period, which ends at two 
days before the restatement filing date. 
FINANCIAL Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm's four digit SIC code is between 
6000 -6999, and 0 otherwise. 
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